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Abstract
We present the architecture of an automatic early warning system (EWS) that
aims at providing predictions and advice regarding security threats in information
and communication technology without incorporation of cognitive abilities of hu-
mans and forms the basis for drawing a situation picture. Our EWS particularly
targets the growing malware threat and shall achieve the required capabilities by
combining malware collectors, malware analysis systems, malware behavior clus-
tering, signature generation and distribution and malware/misuse detection system
into an integrated process chain. The quality and timeliness of the results delivered
by the EWS are influenced by the number and location of participating partners that
share information on security incidents. In order to enable such a cooperation and
an effective deployment of the EWS, interests and confidentiality requirements of
the parties involved need to be carefully examined. We discuss technical details of
the EWS components, evaluate alternatives and examine the interests of all parties
involved in the anticipated deployment scenario.
1 Introduction
Along with the growing dependency of our society on information technology (IT)
systems, concerns regarding IT security are becoming more urgent. While up to now
primarily preventive measures and mechanisms have been focused, it becomes increas-
ingly apparent that IT security cannot be achieved by prevention alone. Rather, pre-
ventive measures and reactive aspects need to complement one another. Precondition
to reaction on security incidents is a dependable and timely detection of respective
situations. A cooperative information exchange between different institutions is not
only advantageous, but also mandatory in order to detect distributed and coordinated
attacks. From a large-scale acquisition of pertinent information by an early warning
system (EWS) arises the opportunity to draw up the situation picture that allows the
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detection of trends and upcoming threats, thereby allowing to take appropriate mea-
sures.
The need for integrating data in order to construct such a situation picture is widely
accepted (cf. e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. However, typically there exist reservations concerning
the distribution of information allowing outsiders insights into security incidents of
individual institutions. These reservations are opposing the integration of information
and so far prohibit the creation of a situation picture. A practical EWS needs to take
the conflicting interests of the participating parties into consideration. A resolution of
the conflicts can be achieved by using information reductions, e.g., pseudonymization.
Though the term EWS has been used in the literature, there is no common, accepted
definition of what early warning is (and no differentiation to, e.g., intrusion detection
systems (IDS)). A vague definition of an early warning information system (EWIS) is
given by [6], who defines EWIS by sketching its purpose: ‘EWIS assists experts and
policy makers in assessing desired options for...’ several particular security measures.
By outlining one particular realization technique, [6] defines ‘[an EWS] for IT security
surveillance is based on a specific procedure to detect as early as possible any departure
from usual or normal observed frequency of phenomena.’ A more general operational
definition of early warning is used by [1]: ‘In case of perceptible indicators, and no or
(still) a low number of victims, information must be distributed, to help others – not yet
victims, including response organizations, in order to avoid a major crisis.’ We adopt
the more declarative definition given by [7]: ‘EWS aim at detecting unclassified but
potentially harmful system behavior based on preliminary indications and are comple-
mentary to intrusion detection systems. Both kinds of systems try to detect, identify
and react before possible damage occurs and contribute to an integrated and aggregated
situation report (big picture). A particular emphasis of EWS is to establish hypothe-
ses and predictions as well as to generate advices in still not completely understood
situations. Thus the term early has two meanings, a) to start early in time aiming to
avoid/minimize damage, and b) to process uncertain and incomplete information.’
This paper sketches the architecture of such an early warning system that is par-
ticularly targeting the malware threat and is currently under development. The funda-
mental requirements of an early warning system are a) automatic detection of known
as well as unknown automated security violations, and b) automated indication of se-
curity incidents in the form of alerts, which can be combined into a situation picture.
These capabilities shall be achieved by combining the following technologies to an
integrated automated process chain: 1) capturing active malware using honeypot tech-
nology based malware collectors, 2) analysis of malware and generation of patterns
for detecting malware (signatures) using machine learning techniques, 3) central con-
solidation and storage of the generated signatures, 4) distribution and deployment of
signatures to signature-based detection systems, 5) central alerting to an emergency
response center.
Our contribution is threefold. Firstly, we describe the architecture of our EWS in
Sect. 2, followed by a discussion of the anticipated deployment scenario in Sect. 3. Sec-
ondly, we discuss the technical and organizational challenges, which need to be con-
sidered when implementing the EWS, and sketch technical details of the components
of our EWS in Sect. 4. Thirdly, deployment issues, in particular regarding participating
parties, their interests and the resulting privacy and confidentiality requirements for an
EWS, are examined in Sect. 4.5. Finally, we discuss related work and summarize in
Sect. 5.
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2 Architecture
We propose the following architecture for an EWS as shown in Fig. 1. It comprises
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Figure 1: Architecture of the early warning system
four basic components. The collecting and learning (CL) box bundles the functional
components to collect malware, to analyze malware to extract features used for learn-
ing and to generate appropriate detection patterns. Automated signature generation is a
primary focus of the described project. Because of the honeypot component placed up-
stream our approach can exploit the assumptions that the collected and analyzed files
are malware indeed. The threat repository is used to centrally manage information
on malware and detection criteria delivered by CL boxes. It supplies the information
needed for detecting malware to the detecting and alerting (DA) boxes, which con-
tain the functional components to detect respective security violations and to generate
alerts. Alerts generated by the DA boxes as well as information on malware supplied
by the threat repository form the basis for constructing a situation picture and they are
centrally managed in the alert repository. Please note that, even if not the case in the
particular design discussed here, multiple threat and alert repositories are possible and
cooperative exchange of information between different EWS at the repository level can
be foreseen. The overall procedure allows to match signatures for detecting misuse of
observed threats in a timely and fully automated manner. It is designed to simulta-
neously achieve the following: retaining the advantage of misuse detection to provide
specific alerts with a low false positive rate and compensating for the original weakness
of misuse detection to detect only a priori known security violations.
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3 Deployment Scenario – Parties and Interests
Both the protection level achieved for the participating systems and the quality of the
situation picture depend on the number and placement of deployed CL boxes as well
as DA boxes. The more CL boxes are deployed at suitable locations in the network the
higher will be the likelihood that new malware is collected during an early stage of its
distribution and signatures for detection systems are supplied by the threat repository
early enough to observe, detect and restrict further distribution of the malware. The
more DA boxes are suitably placed in the network the more comprehensive the infor-
mation base for constructing the situation picture will be. The installation of a larger
number of CL boxes as well as DA boxes in different network domains is anticipated
as sketched in Fig. 2. A primary prerequisite is that the domain owners agree to co-
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Figure 2: Domains of an example deployment scenario
operatively exchange information on security incidents. Without additional protective
measures, there exists, e.g., for the owner of the threat repository the possibility to
gain knowledge about the occurrence of security incidents in the domains of CL boxes.
Analogously, the owner of the emergency response center gains insight into security
incidents detected in the domains of DA boxes. Since this may conflict with the inter-
ests of the domain owners, an agreement about exchanging the required information
is hard to achieve. To resolve this problem and to rebut respective reservations, we
investigate requirements on data and privacy protection for required information flows
and consider complying information reductions, e.g., pseudonymization (cf. ‘data and
confidentially protection’ in Fig. 2). In particular, such information reductions effec-
tively confine owners of central components to acquire sensitive information, without
affecting the functionality of the system or significantly reducing the quality of the
situation picture. In the following we refine the deployment scenario (cf. Fig. 2) by
discussing the suitable parties for operating the system components and elaborating on
their interests.
For the current setting, we expect that the alert repository is operated by a govern-
ment agency, such as the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), which
is officially commissioned to provide a situation picture. The agency might also out-
source the operation to a CERT (computer emergency response team) or a private sec-
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tor enterprise. Alternative models would be a private company providing the situation
picture as a payable service, or a closed consortium of the EWS member organizations.
The threat repository may also be operated by a government agency, a CERT, a
private sector company or a consortium of EWS member organizations. If the oper-
ating organizations of the alert and the threat repository differ, suitable combinations
of operating organizations are subject to further investigation. Organizations that al-
ready operate an IDS are natural candidates for member organizations of an EWS. The
primary driving force behind installing a DA box is the organization’s interest in the
information provided by the situation picture and its value for safeguarding its assets.
All sectors that rely on IT services are promising candidates for operating DA boxes,
i.e., government agencies, academia and private sector organizations.
For the CL boxes, the same consideration as before applies. In particular, a service
provider may be specialized on providing a broad and representative collection of mal-
ware samples. While it is perfectly possible that an organization specializes either on
collecting malware and generating signatures, or on detecting incidents and providing
alerts, a combined operation of DA and of CL boxes is valuable. Operating both kinds
of boxes allows the organization to generate new signatures to cater to its own need for
detecting locally occurring malware and thwarting its recurring occurrence.
4 Details
4.1 Malware Collector
For collecting malware, server-honeypots like Nepenthes [8] and Amun [9], which pro-
vide vulnerable services in order to attract spreading malware, are used in our EWS.
These systems are presently able to collect malware that exploits known vulnerabilities.
Therefore they emulate vulnerable services. Spreading malware exploits vulnerable
services to enter the victim system and downloads the malware binary from a malware
distribution system (MDS) afterwards. Payload targeting an emulated service vulner-
ability is captured and analyzed by the malware collector, the URL of the malware
binary on the MDS is extracted and the malware binary is downloaded eventually.
4.2 Malware Analysis System – Sandbox
Malware analysis systems are used for inspecting and extracting features of malware
that are appropriate for characterizing and distinguishing malware and benign pro-
grams. Static and dynamic analysis can be distinguished. Static analysis focuses on
static features that can be directly extracted from a malware sample. Sequences of
data and instructions of a sample are typical examples. Morphing (aka obfuscation)
techniques and tools demonstrate that programs of similar functionality do not need
to share similar instruction and data sequences, leading to polymorphic and metamor-
phic variants of malware [10]. Consequently, higher-level structural features like the
control-flow graphs (CFG) of programs, which can be extracted by disassemblers, are
studied (e.g. [11]). These techniques assume that similar programs need to share a sim-
ilar structure. Unfortunately, albeit not yet commonly used by today’s malware authors,
techniques exist to change the program structure without changing its functionality.
Dynamic analysis avoids these drawbacks by focusing on the dynamic behavior
of a program, which can be extracted by executing a program and closely observing
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its activities, e.g., at the system call level. As polymorphic variants of the same mal-
ware are behaving almost identical, polymorphic samples are easily detected based on
their common behavior [12]. Even some metamorphic techniques can be thwarted that
way. A difficulty with dynamic techniques is to trigger the malicious execution path
of the program under observation. Nevertheless, we postulate that dynamic analysis
is the most promising alternative for malware analysis and detection. The actions of a
malware are described by its interaction with the operating system (OS), specifically
the system calls it uses. The trace of a malware represents the list of all system calls
that are performed by the malware. As a malware can start multiple threads or even
processes, the trace contains multiple blocks, each one describing one thread. Inside
of the blocks the system calls are ordered chronologically. In the context of the project
described here, CWSandbox [13] is used as dynamic malware analysis system.
4.3 Automatic Signature Creation
The creation of behavioral signatures consists of two steps (Fig. 3). The first step
is to group similar behavior reports together. To do so, a function is needed, that
computes the (dis)similarity of two traces. Which function is used has a great impact
on the resulting groups, as it determines the used features and their weighting. In the
second step a signature is created for each of the resulting groups. During this step an
additional set of traces is used, which contains the behavior of benign executables and
is called the good pool. The usage of the good pool helps keeping the false-positive
rate low.
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Figure 3: Signature generation process
Clustering. The grouping of malware traces can be done using a cluster algorithm
(which groups elements from a set S regarding certain features into subsets Ci (clusters)
such that S =
⋃
i Ci). Most algorithms will create disjoint clusters, i.e., Ci ∩C j = /0
for i 6= j. Unfortunately, there exist malware samples that show behavior common
to multiple families, and thus their traces could be put into different groups. There
are even samples that contain more than one individual malware. Overlapping cluster
algorithms that allow the presence of one element in multiple Ci are therefore of special
interest to us. A cluster algorithm suited for our needs should fulfill the following
criteria:
1. The only input parameter the algorithm needs are pairwise distances. This means
that no special metric is required and makes the used metric interchangeable.
2. It should be able to handle noisy data (be robust). This provides the algorithm
with a better ability to handle outliers and enables stronger generalization.
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3. The number of clusters to be generated should not be part of the input, as an
appropriate choice depends on the data set and varies between data sets.
Cluster algorithms fulfilling the above criteria are for example hierarchical clustering
algorithms (single-, complete-link, WPGMA, UPGMA) [14] and fuzzy clustering [15]
which also provides overlapping clusters, which would certainly improve the quality
of the clustering, though it is not necessarily needed. The quality of the clustering
depends on the distance metric used. We have to compute distances between traces
of every pair of malware samples, and to do so repeatedly and thus highly efficiently.
The distance between two traces relies on the properties that the metric will take into
account. These properties can be quite different between different metrics and it has to
be carefully examined which one to choose.
A well known approach is to treat the traces as long strings and use the edit dis-
tance, which computes the cost of making the two strings equal and relates these costs
to the length of the strings. The edit distance has been used in malware analysis by Lee
and Mody [16]. Unfortunately, the runtime complexity of the edit distance is O(n2) in
the length of the strings. Another possibility is the use of the normalized compression
distance (NCD) [17], which approximates the Kolmogorov complexity using compres-
sion algorithms. The runtime of NCD is tied to the runtime complexity of the used
compression algorithm. It has been employed succesfully for malware analysis [18]
and in many other fields. The used compression algorithm has to be choosen carefully
as shown by Cebrián et. al. [19]. A fundamental problem with NCD is that it only
measures the structural complexity of a string and ignores any semantic context. It is
debatable whether the structural differences of the traces of different malware samples
reflect their behavioral distance indeed. A quite different idea is based on an embed-
ding function which embeds sequential data into a high-dimensional vector space using
a formal language L. Each dimension of a vector corresponds to a specific word of L
and holds the number of occurrences in the data. The dimensionality of each vector
depends on the number of words in L which is usually very high. As the resulting vec-
tors are very sparse, special data structures can be used to store them [20]. To compute
the (dis)similarity between elements of the vector space the Lm (Minkowski) metrics
can be chosen, which is defined as Lm(x,y) = (∑ni=1 |xi− yi|m)
1
m . Another possibility
is the usage of similarity coefficients.
Our experiments [21] showed that the usage of the Manhattan distance L1 (along
with tries) outperformed the NCD (using ppmd and lzma compression) as well as the
edit distance. The edit distance yielded better results than the NCD variants. Thus,
for further development of our EWS, we chose the vectorization using the Manhattan
distance.
Behavioral Signature Creation. The creation of the signatures is performed for a
group of malware traces found to be similar using the clustering approach. The goal
is to determine sequences of system calls that are shared among these traces, but are
absent in normal programs taken from the good pool. One possibility is to find all sub-
strings s1, ...,sl shared between all traces in the group and build a signature that matches
a sequence if all of the shared strings are contained. The shared substrings can be found
using generalized suffix trees, which can be build in time O(n1+n2+ ...+nm), where ni
is the length of the i-th trace, using the algorithm of Ukkonen [22]. Another approach
relies on the embedding into a vector space and the use of a support vector machine
(SVM) (which finds an optimal hyperplane between two sets of vectors). Choosing the
sets Sm and Sb as the sets of vectors belonging to the malicious traces and the benign
traces, respectively, the hyperplane found by a SVM can be taken as a signature.
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Optimization. The clustering as well as the signature creation can be time consuming
and thus, for the early warning context, demands to deploy optimization techniques like
the following one. If a new sample arrives its behavior is tested against the existing
signatures first. If any signature matches no further action is taken. If no signature
matches, the distances of the new sample (resp. its behavior) to the existing groups
of malware traces are evaluated. The new sample is added into the group that exhibits
the smallest distance to the sample’s trace and the signature for that group is recreated.
As this procedure might worsen the quality of the clusters (creating a new singleton
cluster or splitting an old cluster may be better), a complete re-clustering is performed
periodically for all traces.
Validation. There are essentially two problems that can occur. The signature can be too
specific or to general. To ensure that the signature is not too specific, a technique called
X-fold-Cross validation is used. The group of malware traces for which a signature is
to be created is divided into X parts. X−1 of these parts are used to create the signature
while the remaining part is used for testing. If the signature is good and generalizes to
a suitable extent, the traces not considered for signature creation should be detected as
well. To ensure that the signature is not too general, the signature is tested against the
good pool. X-fold-Cross validation can be used here as well.
4.4 Malware/Misuse Detection Systems
Misuse detection systems are used to detect security incidents based on observations
of security relevant events and signatures. Examples of available solutions that support
this functionality include intrusion detection systems, virus scanners and firewalls. It
is beneficial to integrate as many of the available detection products into the EWS
as possible. Due to space restrictions we abstain from discussing common technical
requirements of detection systems here and focus on requirements that are specific to
the deployment of the detection systems within the EWS.
When integrated with EWS, detection systems need to be able to receive new sig-
natures from a threat repository, to deploy them on the fly, and to forward generated
alerts to an alert repository. Further, the signatures supplied by the EWS need to be
compatible with the employed detection system. In particular the feature domain used
for generating signatures in the EWS and the features observed and analyzed by the
detection systems need to compatible. That is, the behavioral features of malware
that are extracted using CWSandbox and used for signature generation need to be ob-
served/monitored by the detection system in order to support effective matching of the
supplied signatures. For integrating existing detection systems possibilities to trans-
form signatures between different domains need to be realized.
Besides the integration of existing detection systems in DA boxes, a detection sys-
tem called jSAM (Java Signature Analysis Module) is in under development that pro-
vides full support of the behavioral features used in EWS supplied signatures. Further
highlights of jSAM are the expressiveness of the used signature language EDL (Event
Description Language) [23], which is also used as signature transfer language inside
the EWS, as well as the optimized matching strategies.
4.5 Privacy and Confidentiality Requirements
We first consider entities and their potential relation to personal data. Malware samples
may contain (hidden) clues about their authors and endpoint addresses of malware
target systems (MTS), which are targeted victims of attacks executed by malware (e.g.,
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a denial of service attack) and malware drop zones (MDZ), where data copied from
victim systems (VS) is uploaded. While MDZ may be operated by malware authors,
this is usually not the case. The copied data is rather delivered to VS that are controlled
by malware authors. VS often are poorly managed home computers operated by
natural persons. Hence, we consider MTS as well as MDZ endpoint data as personal
data. Malware spreads from so-called malware host systems (MHS), and the CL Box
can observe the MHS endpoint of a malware trying to spread to the CL Box. From
the observed exploit payload the CL Box can extract the malware distribution system
(MDS) endpoint. In the vast majority of cases the MHS and MDS are VS. Hence,
we consider MHS and MDS endpoint data as personal data. We do not protect the
interests of malware authors and will therefore ignore them in the following.
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Figure 4: Flow of private and confidential data
Next, we inspect the data flow from malware VS via a CL box to the central threat
repository (cf. Fig. 4). The CL Box initially receives the exploit of a given malware and
can identify the originating MHS. In a second step, the CL Box extracts the download
endpoint of the (possibly different) MDS (cf. Sect. 4.1) where the complete malware
sample is situated and finally downloads it. As follows, the CL Box receives the fol-
lowing data concerning the attacking MHS: sending endpoint (IP, port) and payload
(exploit); and from the malware sample serving MDS: download endpoint (IP, port,
protocol-specific path) and payload (malware sample). In addition the following data
can be determined: receiving endpoint (CL Box IP, port), name of the vulnerable ser-
vice, timestamp, malware sample id (e.g., md5 hash value). For further processing,
the CL Box persists the following data to the local threat repository, which then will
be sent to the global threat repository (as defined above): sending endpoint, receiving
endpoint, download endpoint, name of vulnerable service, malware sample, timestamp,
malware sample id. In addition malware analysis systems may extract additional po-
tentially confidential data from malware samples (e.g., endpoint data of MTS, MDS or
MDZ) and provide it to the threat repositories. CL boxes also provide automatically
4 DETAILS 10
generated signatures to the threat repository, where a signature detects an observable
behavioral pattern of the collected malware sample. The signatures are distributed to
the DA boxes for malware detection. DA boxes may use a network interface (observ-
ing endpoint) for observing network behavior. When a DA box successfully matches a
signature to observed behavior it generates an alert that primarily contains a timestamp
and the name of the matched signature.
Additionally, we classify the functionality of the EWS into two broad classes: anal-
ysis and reaction. Analyzing the features delivered by the CL and DA boxes means
relating events (malware samples, alerts) by means of their features. This requires that
the features that are used to relate events to each other be linkable (linkability require-
ment). Note that features can be transformed, such that they are still linkable, but do
not easily give away the original information [24]. The EWS warns its participants
by providing names or port numbers of services that are currently critical, endpoints
from where malware is downloaded, notifies VS endpoints that have been infected by
malware, etc. To be able to do so and to make the distributed information actionable
for the receivers, the information can be provided in transformed form, e.g., encrypted,
but the receivers must be able to disclose the original data (disclosure requirement). As
an example, a DA box may use the MDS address feature to block outbound malware
downloads at the firewall of the domain. For this the DA box must be able to see the IP
address of the MDS in the clear.
We finally examine the interests of the involved parties regarding the ability to link
and disclose personal or otherwise confidential data from the data flows considered
above. Malware VS are usually involved when outbound and inbound activity of MHS
is recorded (exploit phase), when a malware sample is downloaded from MDS, when
malware attacks MTS, as well as when malware copies data from VS to MDZ. Ad-
dresses of MDS, MTS and MDZ may be hardcoded in the malware sample. Since we
consider VS to be identified with the operating persons, the related data is personal
data. These persons are assumed to be interested in protecting their privacy and as
such are not interested in the disclosure and linkability of their personal data. They
however are interested in the disclosure and linkability of the personal data of other VS
attacking them, to be able to defend their assets or claim compensation.
CL boxes, as well as DA boxes are assumed to be operated by organizations, not by
natural persons. We also assume that the boxes are provided as stand-alone systems that
have no users, except for initial administrative purposes. As a result we do not need to
consider personal data regarding these boxes. It remains to consider the remaining data
that is sent out to the repositories. This data can be considered sensitive when observed
by customers or competitors, such that the organization is interested in keeping them
confidential. At the same time a given organization may be interested in the malware
incident data of other organizations to gain a competitive edge.
The threat repository and the alert repository merely collect data from the CL boxes
and DA boxes, respectively. The data in the threat repository may be refined and en-
riched manually, but it will still not refer to the operating organization. Hence, we
do not need to consider personal data of the operating organizations here. The role
of the global threat repository is providing information to DA boxes for detecting and
possibly directly blocking malware. For the purpose of transitory blacklisting sites in-
volved in the outbreak of a given malware, the threat repository needs to disclose the
endpoints of MDS, as well as MDZ. Proactively patching or shutting down services
would be enabled by disclosing the receiving port numbers of the malware collector.
Repository data refinement and analysis for enrichment is enabled by disclosure of the
payloads (exploits and malware sample). Duplicate elimination is necessary for effi-
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ciency reasons. The alert repository needs to be able to link all data items to create a
situation picture. Some data needs to be disclosed for detailed reporting and advisories
for time-critical and transitory blacklisting.
Table 1: Summary of feature specific interests of the involved entities and inter-
est support by the proposed balance of conflicting interests – c: confidentiality of
own/domain-local feature; l: linkability of remote feature; d: disclosure of remote
feature; blank: party has no interest; I: party’s interest is not supported; S: party’s in-
terest is fully supported; P: party’s interest is supported merely against selected other
parties
feature
controlled victim CL DA threat alertby box box repository repository
attacker c l d c l d l d l d
timestamp Yes P S I S S
alert signature name Yes P S I S S S
sending endpoint of MHS Yes I I I P S I S S S
receiving endpoint of MTS Yes I I I P S I S S S
download endpoint of MDS Yes P I I I S S S S S
upload endpoint of MDZ Yes P I I I S S S S S
vulnerability module name Yes I S S S S S
receiv. endpoint of CL box S I I S S
observ. endpoint of DA box S I I S S
malware exploit payload Yes I S S S S
malware sample payload Yes P I I I S S S S
Table 1 summarizes the interests of all parties, which, obviously, may conflict. For
example, VS want to keep their endpoints confidential and CL boxes also want to keep
their existence confidential. However, e.g., DA boxes of other domains are generally
interested in disclosing these features. It is therefore necessary to define a suitable
balance between the conflicting interests. In some cases it suffices to support a given
interest in linkability or disclosure only for the repository owners, in other cases it
is necessary to support the given interest also for DA boxes. The proposed balance
supports the confidentiality requirements of VS only partially: box owners and repos-
itory owners can in most cases link and disclose the VS endpoint. The confidentiality
requirements of CL and DA box owners can only be supported for the receiving CL
endpoint, the observing DA endpoint and the timestamp feature; for the other features it
is necessary to let other DA boxes link and disclose them to allow for timely response.
An array of techniques to balance interests was discussed in [25].
5 Related Work and Summary
A few EWS has been proposed in the literature. They all have the sharing and central
collection of information in common but they can be differentiated regarding the kind
of information that is processed and correlated. Another differentiating feature of EWS
is the way they establish hypotheses and predictions and generate advice. Existing
systems support information aggregation and visualization as well as statistic analysis
but predictions or advice generation is left to the human user. In the following we
discuss and compare related approaches regarding these differentiating features.
DShield’s Internet Storm Center [2] operates on firewall logs of several organiza-
tions and incorporates human interpretation and action in order to generate predictions
and advice. MyNetWatchman [26] also processes firewall logs of multiple organiza-
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tions but supports automatic generation of email notifications. eCSIRT.net system [3]
comprises of a sensor network of intrusion detection systems. It collects and corre-
lates alerts of these system which are visualized for human inspection. The Internet
Motion Sensor (IMS) [27] statistically analyses dark net traffic that need to be inter-
preted by humans. SURFids [28] stores malware binaries collected by a network of
Nepenthes sensors in a central database and supports generation of several statistics.
The Deepsight system uses about 19000 sensors that provide IDS alerts, firewall logs
and honeynet data. Human analysis and data mining is incorporated in order to provide
statistics. Zou et al [29] propose the Malware Warning Center that realizes worm detec-
tion based on an epidemic propagation model. It is focused on worms that uniformly
scan the internet and aims at early detection of worm epidemics. The Internet Mal-
ware Analysis System (InMAS) [4] collects malware using honeypots, honeyclients
and spamtraps and analyses collected files using CWSandbox. Predefined statistics on
collected information can be visualized using a statistic backend. The Internet Analy-
sis System (IAS) [30] collects and visualizes statistics on network packet data in order
to support detection of anomalies by humans. eDare (Early Detection, Alert and Re-
sponse system) [31] and the Agent-based EWS [5] are two further proposals to support
early warning. While Agent-EWS basically propose to centrally collect information of
different sensors the eDare systems propose to use supervised machine learning tech-
niques for detecting unknown malware. ADWICE [32], which is part of the Safeguard
project, uses unsupervised learning to generate a model of normal traffic and performs
outlier detection to find anomalies. The CarmentiS project [1], advanced by the Ger-
man CERT association, is another initiative towards cooperative sharing, central stor-
age and visualization of different kinds of sensor data, which is planed to be extended
to by correlation techniques in order to automatically generate advice and predictions.
In comparison to these approaches, our system operates on different kinds of in-
formation, which are potentially new malware samples (collected, e.g., by Nepenthes),
malware behavior (extracted, e.g., by CWSandbox), automatically generated and dis-
tributed signatures (generated using machine learning techniques) as well as detection
alerts (generated by detection systems using the signatures). Due to the automatic
derivation of new signatures and central reporting of occurrences of new malware
threats, it forms a basis to generating predictions and advice without incorporation of
cognitive abilities of humans and is therefore a large step towards an Automatic EWS
that automatically contribute to a situation picture.
Accordingly, in this paper we have described the architecture of our automatic EWS
and discussed details regarding alternative implementations of its key components.
While malware collection and analysis is mainly realized using existing approaches,
clustering of malware behavior and generating behavior signatures in the context of
our EWS are focus of our research. Enforcing a balance between conflicting confiden-
tiality and availability requirements is another key research challenge of this ongoing
project. Based on a discussion of a deployment scenario, interests and requirements of
all involved parties are examined. A balance between conflicting interests is proposed
and mechanisms appropriate to enforce this balance are mentioned. Besides complet-
ing ongoing efforts to implement the EWS components, future work in this project
includes the deployment and evaluation of the EWS.
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